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RECENT CASES
LABOR LAW-UNEPLOYMENT COmPENSATIoN-APPLICABLE DISQUAL-
IFICATION PROVISION VHERE CLAIMANT IS DISCHARGED FOR BREACH OF A
No-STRIxE CLAUSE
Twenty-four claimants for unemployment insurance benefits were employed
by a plastic and chemical manufacturing corporation as production workers.
The union representing these employees had a collective bargaining agreement
with the employer which prohibited lockouts, strikes and other work stoppages
while reserving to the employer the right to discharge employees for just cause.
Officers of the union determined that the employer had breached the agreement
when a dispute arose concerning the return of three supervisors to their former
positions in the bargaining unit. Although the agreement provided for a grievance
procedure, approximately 625 union members went on strike. Picket lines were
established, but there were no incidents of violence or abusive language. The
strike was discontinued after a few days at which time the employer discharged
the twenty-four claimants because of their violation of the agreement's no-strike
clause. In ruling upon the claimants subsequent filing for unemployment insur-
ance benefits, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board held that the claim-
ants, under the industrial controversy provision,1 were disqualified from receiving
benefits during the period of the strike but were not disqualified thereafter,
under the misconduct provision,2 from receiving benefits for the duration
of their unemployment. An appeal was taken from that portion of the Board's
decision finding the employees innocent of misconduct. The Appellate Di-
vision affirmed3 and the employer appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
two judges dissenting. Held, the industrial controversy provision is the exclusive
provision applicable to all instances of unemployment resulting from mere par-
ticipation in a strike which violates a collective bargaining agreement. Claim of
Heitzenrater, 19 N.Y.2d 1, 224 N.E.2d 72, 277 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1966).
The enactment of the federal Social Security Act of 19354 encouraged the
states to pass unemployment insurance statutes to ameliorate the social and
economic burdens caused by involuntary unemployment.5 By July of 1937, all
1. N.Y. Labor Law § 592(1) provides:
Industrial controversy. The accumulation of benefit rights by a claimant shall
be suspended during a period of seven consecutive weeks beginning with the day
after he lost his employment because of a strike, lockout, or other industrial contro-
versy in the establishment in which he was employed, except that benefit rights may
be accumulated before the expiration of such seven weeks beginning with the day
after such strike, lockout, or other industrial controversy was terminated.
2. N.Y. Labor Law § 593(3) provides:
Misconduct. No days of total unemployment shall be deemed to occur after a
claimant lost his last employment prior to the filing of his claim through misconduct
in connection with his employment until he has subsequently worked in employ-
ment on not less than three days in each of four weeks or earned remuneration of
at least two hundred dollars.
3. Matter of Heitzenrater, 22 A.D.2d 542, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (3d Dep't 1965).
4. Larson and Murrary, The Development of Unemployinent Insurance in the United
States, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 181, 188-89 (1955); see also Comment, Charity Versus Social Insur-
ance in Unemployment Compensation Laws, 73 Yale L.J. 357, 367-69 (1963).
5. Matter of Machcinski, 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1951).
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the states, the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii had passed legislation
complying with the basic requirements of the Social Security Act.0 These require-
ments afforded the legislatures of each state wide flexibility and discretion to
develop benefit, eligibility and disqualification provisions best suited to the con-
ditions prevailing within the individual state.7 In New York, the major causes
for disqualifying an individual from benefit rights are discharge for misconduct
connected with the work,8 leaving work voluntarily without good cause9 and
refusing to accept suitable work.'0 In addition, if an individual loses his employ-
ment "because of a strike, lockout, or other industrial controversy" benefits are
suspended for seven consecutive weeks or until the dispute is terminated, which-
ever occurs sooner." The Unemployment Insurance Law purports to establish
"fault" or "voluntariness" as the standard by which the operation of these pro-
visions is to be gauged,1 2 and the courts of New York frequently have asserted
that the purpose behind the Act is to compensate only those persons "unem-
ployed through no fault of their own.' 3 However, the courts have not applied
this standard strictly in all instances, and have recognized that although an
individual's unemployment may be voluntary and therefore technically his
"fault," he is not necessarily foreclosed from receiving benefits if mitigating
circumstances exist.' 4 This is particularly true in situations involving a voluntary
leaving of work or the refusal to accept suitable employment.'8 Furthermore, the
concepts of "fault" and "voluntariness" are totally irrelevant to the application
6. Larson and Murrary, supra note 4, at 188-89.
7. Preface to U.S. Dep't of Labor, B.E.S. No. U-141, Comparison of State Unemploy-
ment Insurance Laws as of January 1, 1966, at v. This periodic publication contains useful
comparisons in textual and tabular form and may be obtained from the Superintendent of
Documents, United States Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
8. N.Y. Labor Law § 593(3).
9. Id. § 593(1).
10. Id. § 593(2).
11. Id. § 592(1).
12. Id. § 501 provides: "Public policy of state . . . Economic insecurity due to
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, welfare, and morale of the people of
this state .... [tihe public good and the well-being of the wage earners of this state require
the enactment of this measure ... for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault
of their own." This assertion of policy has remained constant since the enactment of the
original Unemployment Insurance Act, [19353 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 408.
13. E.g. Matter of Ferrara, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.E.2d 43, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1961);
Matter of Wentworth, 10 A.D.2d 504, 200 N.Y.S.2d 849 (3d Dep't 1960), aff'd, 10 N.Y.S.2d
13, 176 N.E.2d 50, 217 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1961) ; Matter of Marder, 16 A.D.2d 303, 227 N.Y.S.2d
730 (3d Dep't 1962); Matter of Sellers, 13 A.D.2d 204, 215 N.Y.S.2d 385 (3d Dep't 1961);
Matter of Austen, 285 App. Div. 577, 139 N.Y.S.2d 690 (3d Dep't 1955).
14. The courts indicate that values and considerations other than "fault" are involved.
See, e.g., Matter of Lauria, 18 A.D.2d 848, 236 N.Y.S.2d 168 (3d Dep't 1963) (Claimant was
entitled to unemployment compensation even though she voluntarily left her employment
to follow her husband to another locality where he had moved for his health.); Matter of
Kalm, 278 App. Div. 1035, 106 N.Y.S.2d 914 (3d Dep't 1951) (Although claimant was
denied unemployment compensation for his voluntary refusal to accept suitable work, the
Court pointed out that circumstances may exist which would justify an individual's volun-
tary refusal to accept work.); see also Matter of Walls, 26 A.D.2d 883, 274 N.Y.S.2d 205
(3d Dep't 1966); Matter of Bradstreet, 25 A.D.2d 348, 269 N.Y.S.2d 571 (3d Dep't 1966) ;
Matter of Oscodar, 25 A.D.2d 913, 270 N.Y.S.2d 81 (3d Dep't 1966); Matter of Martino, 24
A.D.2d 772, 263 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dep't 1965).
15. See cases cited supra note 14.
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of the industrial controversy provision.' 6 Unlike the provisions of other states,17
New York's industrial controversy section excludes all employees from benefits
for a maximum seven weeks suspension period if a dispute exists in the estab-
lishment in which they are employed.' 8 This suspension occurs regardless of
whether the particular individual is participating in the dispute, financing the
dispute, or directly interested in it.' 9 Further, fault on the part of the employer
and the involuntariness of resulting unemployment is also irrelevant since bene-
fits are suspended even if employment is lost due to a lockout by the employer.20
The purpose of the industrial controversy provision is to compel "the State...
to stand aside for a time, pending the settlement of differences between employ-
er[s] and employees, to avoid the imputation that a strike may be financed
through unemployment insurance benefits." 2 ' In effect, it is an attempt by the
state to maintain a completely neutral role in labor disputes.22
Generally, the industrial controversy disqualification provisions of the vari-
ous state statutes do not define the term "industrial controversy" or "labor
disputes.123 The majority of courts, however, have adopted the federal definition
of "labor dispute" found in the anti-injunction and labor relations statutes.24
Thus, in New York unemployment compensation proceedings, the term "indus-
trial controversy" includes virtually any dispute concerning the terms and con-
ditions of employment..2 5 The courts of New York have recognized that the
industrial controversy provision must be liberally construed2 6 and agree with
federal court decisions characterizing wildcat strikes or strikes in breach of no-
strike clauses as industrial controversies.27 Although strikes in breach of no-strike
16. Matter of Gilmartin, 10 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.E.2d 51, 217 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1961); see also
Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification, A Primer and Some Problems, 8 Vand. L.
Rev. 338, 354-55, 367 (1955); Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55
Yale L.J. 167, 169 (1945); Fierst & Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Dis-
putes, 49 Yale LJ. 461, 462 (1940); but see Lewis, The Concept of "Labor Dispute" in State
Unemployment Ins. Laws, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 29 (1966).
17. Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, supra note 7, at table ET-5.
18. N.Y. Labor Law § 592(1).
19. Matter of George, 14 N.Y.2d 234, 199 N.E.2d 503, 250 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1964) ; Matter
of Machcinski, 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1951).
20. N.Y. Labor Law § 592(1); see Williams, supra note 16, at 371.
21. Matter of Burger, 277 App. Div. 234, 236, 98 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (3d Dep't 1950),
aff'd, 303 N.Y. 654, 101 N.E.2d 763 (1951).
22. Matter of Ferrara, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.E.2d 43, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1961).
23. Alabama is the only state which specifically defines the term "labor dispute" in
its labor dispute disqualification provision. Its definition is taken from the Labor-Management
Relations Act § 2(9), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964).
24. Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 294, 300-01 (1950).
25. CCH Unemployment Ins. Rep., New York, § 1980.003 (1966); Lewis, supra note
16, at 53.
26. Matter of Ferrara, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.E.2d 43, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1961); Matter
of Machcinski, 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1951); Matter of Sadowski,
257 App. Div. 529, 13 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d Dep't 1939); cf. Matter of Lasher, 279 App. Div.
505, 111 N.Y.S.2d 356 (3d Dep't 1952); see also Matter of Klein, 15 A.D.2d 201, 222
N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dep't 1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.S.2d 678, 185 N.E.2d 909, 233 N.Y.S.2d 471
(1962); Matter of Sprague, 4 A.D.2d 911, 167 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't 1957).
27. E.g. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962); Carter Carburator
Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944); see also CCH Unemployment Ins. Rep., New
York, § 1980.911 (1966).
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clauses thus fall within the scope of the industrial controversy provision, the
question of whether the application of this provision precludes the application
of the misconduct provision when employees are subsequently discharged for
engaging in such strikes had not been decided in New York prior to the instant
case. The courts of Michigan,28 Illinois29 and Alabama"0 have taken the position
that the industrial controversy provision is the sole applicable section, and a
determination as to misconduct or the merits of the controversy is not within the
province of the unemployment insurance board or the courts. On the other hand,
the courts of New Jersey,31 Pennsylvania3 2 and Wisconsin 3 consider mere em-
ployee participation in an unauthorized strike or a strike in breach of a no-strike
clause as a willful or wanton disregard of the employer's interest3 4 which justifies
disqualification from unemployment insurance benefits under the misconduct
provision.
Judge Fuld, writing the majority opinion in the instant case, held the
industrial controversy provision to be the exclusive section applicable to all
instances of unemployment resulting from a strike or other labor dispute.'
The court based this determination upon an analysis of the statutory language
and the purposes sought to be achieved by this provision. Maintaining that the
exceedingly broad language encompasses all disputes and all strikes, whether
"permissible" or "impermissible," "legal" or "illegal," the Court contended that
the suspension and subsequent payment of benefits after the seven week period
reflects a legislative policy of not fixing the blame for a labor dispute in an
unemployment insurance proceeding."8 The Court reasoned that the allocation
of fault or misconduct in labor disputes involves complex questions of labor rela-
tions best left to federal and state labor boards qualified to resolve them. 7 Noting
28. Lillard v. Employment Sec. Comm'n., 364 Mich. 401, 110 N.W.2d 910 (1961).
Michigan's disqualification statute was subsequently amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.531-
(1) (g) (I) (II) (supp. 1965), to specifically disqualify from benefits an individual who is
discharged for participation in a work stoppage contrary to a collective bargaining agreement
or for participation in a wildcat strike.
29. Local 658, Boot and Shoe Workers v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E.2d 625
(1949).
30. T.R. Miller Co. v. Johns, 261 Ala. 615, 75 So.2d 675 (1954).
31. Compare Bogue Elec. Co. v. Bd. of Review, 21 N.J. 431, 122 A.2d 615 (1956),
with Beaunit Mills v. Bd. of Review, 43 N.J. Super. 172, 128 A.2d 20 (1956).
32. Progress Mfg. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 406 Pa. 163, 176 A.2d
632 (1962).
33. Streeter v. Industrial Comm'n., 269 Wis. 412, 69 N.W.2d 583 (1955).
34. Although the courts of New York have never defined "misconduct," the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Appeal Board, along with most states, has adopted this definition of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 429, 296 N.W. 636
(1941); see also CCH Unemployment Ins. Rep., New York, § 8900 (1955).
35. Claim of Heitzenrater, 19 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 224 N.E.2d 72, 75, 277 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637
(1966).
36. Id. at 7, 224 N.E.2d at 75-76, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38.
37. Id. at 7, 224 N.E.2d at 76, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 638. Such questions, according to the
Court, might include whether the breach of a no-strike clause by employees resulted from
an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer, or whether the work stoppage was
justifiable because of unsafe or unsanitary working conditions, or whether there was a work
stoppage in order to bring about an unlawful objective. Id. at 7-8, 224 N.E.2d at 76, 277
N.Y.S.2d at 638-39.
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that the misconduct provision on its face and in its intendment has nothing to
do with labor disputes, the Court maintained that the provision cannot be rea-
sonably construed to provide that employees who strike in breach of a collective
bargaining agreement are guilty of "misconduct."' 8 The employer's remedies
are limited to discharging those who participated in the strike and bringing an
action for damages against the union which breached the agreement. 39 The
Court reasoned that the Legislature did not intend the Unemployment Insurance
Law to serve as an additional means of disciplining or penalizing employees for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 40 The dissent, on the other hand,
took the position that the misconduct provision was intended as a means of pen-
alizing employees who are discharged for striking in breach of a no-strike con-
tract clause. Participation in such strikes was viewed by the dissent as constitut-
ing misconduct per se.41 It was pointed out that this position does not effectuate
a simultaneous application of the misconduct and industrial controversy provi-
sions since the suspension of benefits during an industrial controversy, and dis-
qualification from benefits thereafter for discharge due to misconduct, involve
separate events, distinct in time and circumstances.42 The dissent asserted that
the effect of the majority decision was to dilute the effectiveness of no-strike
clauses and arbitration provisions, thus relegating the employer to inadequate
remedies 43 and causing employer subsidization of illegal strikes.44
The dual application of the industrial controversy and misconduct provi-
sions to situations involving the breach of a no-strike clause presents no real
inherent difficulty, since conduct which constitutes an industrial controversy can
be viewed conceptually as also constituting misconduct. It is a settled rule in the
area of labor relations that "the no-strike clause in a collective [bargaining]
agreement at the very least establishes a rule of conduct or condition of employ-
ment the violation of which by employees justifies discipline or discharge. 4 5
Thus, if the employer is permitted to discharge employees who strike in breach
of a no-strike clause, such discharge should result in a presumption of misconduct
within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance Law. Discharge for mere
participation in such strikes should not constitute misconduct per se, however,
38. Id. at 8-9, 224 N.E.2d at 76, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 639. The Court did assert, however,
that the existence of an industrial controversy does not automatically prohibit any finding
of misconduct. Acts of violence or sabotage committed by employees on strike would
constitute misconduct justifying not only discharge but also disqualification from receiving
unemployment insurance benefits. Id. at 9, 224 N.E.2d at 76, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
39. Id. at 9, 224 NYE.2d at 77, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
40. Id. at 10, 224 N.E.2d at 77, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
41. Id. at 13, 224 N.E.2d at 79, 277 N.Y.S.2d 643. However, in other circumstances,
the dissent maintained that the Unemployment Insurance Board is required, under the mis-
conduct provision, to delve into the merits of an industrial controversy whenever misconduct
is alleged. Id. at 12-13, 224 NYE.2d at 79, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43.
42. Id. at 11-12, 224 N.E.2d at 78-79, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
43. Id. at 12, 224 NE..2d 78-79, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
44. Id. at 13, 224 N.E.2d at 79, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
45. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 246 (1962); see also NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); NLRB v. Furrier's Joint Council, 224 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1955); Mead v. Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 113 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955).
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but would require an administrative inquiry to establish the alleged justification
for striking. The functions of the unemployment insurance agency might then
overlap those of state and federal agencies responsible for administering labor re-
lations statutes, resulting in inconsistent and anomolous decisions. 46 However, the
mere existence of the misconduct provision necessarily requires the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Board to make inquiries into employee behavior when employees
have engaged in conduct which warrants their discharge. The fact that this
inquiry may be made more difficult because of the existence of an industrial
controversy should not cause the Unemployment Insurance Board to abdicate
its fact-finding responsibility under the misconduct provision.
Although the misconduct provision can thus be applied to conduct which
also falls within the scope of the industrial controversy provision, it is unlikely
that the employees in the instant case were guilty of "misconduct." As previ-
ously noted, "misconduct" has been interpreted to mean a willful or wanton
disregard of the employer's interest.47 The state of mind required to disqualify
an individual under the misconduct provision is that associated with "intentional
wrongdoing or gross neglect rather than a simple negligence alone."48 In the
instant case, the presumption of misconduct is rebuttable since a referee of the
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board found the employees "earnestly, sin-
cerely and in good faith" believed that their participation in the strike was
justified.49 The employer had advised the bargaining unit that its supervisory
force was being reduced and that three salaried employees were being restored to
the bargaining unit with seniority dating back to their last respective dates of
hire.50 Officers of the union informed the employees that the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement were rendered void by this alleged breach of the
contract by the employer.51 Since participation in the strike was thus predicated
on a "good faith belief" that the union contract was no longer in effect, the
requisite finding of willful and wanton behavior necessary to constitute "mis-
conduct" did not exist. The misconduct provision, when applied, should be given
a narrow interpretation in order to minimize its penal character.
STUART B. BEDELL
46. Shadur, supra note 24, at 307.
47. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941).
48. Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 307, 334
(1955).
49. Abridged Record on Appeal at 22, Claim of Heitzenrater, 19 N.Y.2d 1, 224 N.E.2d
72, 277 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1966).
50. Id. at 20.
51. Id.
